We propose a generalization of the model of electoral competition between two candidates who di¤er in non-policy characteristics that allows voters to have heterogeneous and private valuations of these characteristics. Unlike models in which voters'valuations of such non-policy characteristics are common and common knowledge and which never admit pure strategy equilibria, in our setup we show existence of both converging and mildly diverging pure strategy equilibria. Perhaps more importantly, we uncover a non-monotonic (U-shaped) relationship between the extent of heterogeneity of voters' preferences in the issue of candidates'non-policy characteristics and the maximum degree of equilibrium platform di¤erentiation. Our analysis a) sheds new light on how a small (large) expected degree of heterogeneity in the voters' preferences on the candidates' non-policy characteristics may lead to a depoliticized (politicized) vote and b) demonstrates that as voters become more heterogeneous in this issue, existence of pure strategy equilibria becomes more likely.
Introduction
In the existing models of electoral competition with a favored candidate or party it is assumed that all voters value one of the candidates'non-policy characteristics more than the opponent's in the same way and that this information is common knowledge by all actors of the model (see for 1 The common knowledge that all voters value the non-policy characteristics of a certain candidate more than the non-policy characteristics of the other one, makes candidates have very diverse incentives as far as electoral platform selection is concerned: the advantaged candidate always wants to depoliticize the electoral campaign -he wants to imitate the policy platform of the disadvantaged candidate so that only the non-policy characteristics will determine how voters will votewhile the disadvantaged candidate always aims at politicize the vote -he wants to o¤er a policy platform distinctly di¤erent from the one o¤ered by the advantaged candidate and hence induce voters to vote also on the basis of which platform they like most. When candidates are Downsian (o¢ ce motivated) these diverse dynamics lead to inexistence of pure strategy equilibria and, subsequently, of stable electoral competition outcomes. In the mixed strategy equilibria of these models the advantaged candidate proposes In these Downsian models with an advantaged candidate, candidates are uncertain about the voters' preferences over policy and share common beliefs about them, but they are certain that all voters prefer the non-policy characteristics of a speci…c candidate. Two natural steps that would make these models more realistic would be a) to allow voters be heterogeneous, not only in policy terms, but also in how they evaluate the non-policy characteristics of candidates and b) to account for candidates having incomplete information in both dimensions -they should be uncertain about how each voter values candidates' non-policy characteristics as well. This is precisely the gap in the literature that this paper aims to …ll.
We propose a generalization of the original model in which di¤ erent voters are allowed to have di¤ erent valuations of candidates' non-policy characteristics. In this set up a voter's valuation of the non-policy characteristics of the candidates is considered as the voter's private information and it is possibly di¤er-ent for each voter. Candidates share a common prior belief on how many voters prefer the non-policy characteristics of one candidate over the other one. Formally, we represent the candidates'beliefs about their non-policy characteristic as a random variable with a Bernoulli distribution that is common for all voters and we assume that each voter's valuation is given by an independent random draw from it. That is, from the candidates' perspective, a voter prefers the non-policy characteristics of the …rst candidate with probability 2 [ 1 2 ; 1]. The assumption that this probability is always at least one-half is obviously without loss of generality and it allows us to address the …rst candidate by the name advantaged candidate simply because he is the one whose non-policy characteristics are expected to be valued more by most voters. In fact, in the model we propose the advantage has two dimensions. On the one hand, there is the magnitude of the di¤erence between the qualities of the two candidates from a voter's point of view (d > 0) and on the other hand there is the probability with which the advantaged candidate enjoys the aforementioned advantage ( > 1 2 ). We …nd that in this model pure strategy equilibria exist for a wide range of parameter values -as long as voters are expected to be su¢ ciently heterogeneous ( > 1 2 but close to 1 2 ) in their preferences regarding candidates' non-policy characteristics. These pure strategy equilibria exhibit converging and mildly diverging pure strategies. Hence it is not the fact that voters have preferences about candidates' non-policy characteristics that rules out pure strategy equilibria but the assumption that preferences of the voters on this issue are common to all voters and they are common knowledge information. These pure strategy equilibria are such that elections are depoliticized: candidates o¤er su¢ ciently similar platforms and each voter votes for the candidate whose non-policy characteristics he values most. Within this range of parameter values, as the expected share of voters who …nd the …rst candidate better than the second increases (that is, as increases), the maximum degree of equilibrium di¤erentiation decreases. The most striking feature of this process is that this decrease in the maximum value of equilibrium di¤erentiation occurs only because the set of equilibrium strategies of the …rst candidate (the advantaged one) shrinks around the centre of the policy space. That is, the set of equilibrium strategies of the second candidate (the disadvantaged one) remains invariant to changes in the expected size of the two groups of voters as long as the group which thinks he is better is su¢ ciently large (that is, as long as 1 is su¢ ciently large). When the expected sizes of the two groups become very asymmetric ( > 1 2 and close to 1) pure strategy equilibria cease to exist and a unique mixed equilibrium exists such that the advantaged candidate locates in the centre of the policy space and the disadvantaged mixes between two policies which are equidistant from the centre of the policy space. This mixed equilibrium is such that elections are politicized: in expected terms some voters vote for the candidate whose non-policy characteristics they value less only because they like the policy he proposed much more than the one of their favored candidate. For these parameter values, as the expected share of voters who …nd the …rst candidate better than the second increases (that is, as increases), the maximum degree of equilibrium di¤erentiation increases. Again, what is most striking is that this is only because the two policies that are part of the disadvantaged candidate's mixed strategy go farther away from the centre of the policy space while the equilibrium behavior of the advantaged candidate remains una¤ected.
This shows that when a candidate starts to become advantaged, he most probably moves towards the centre while at the same time the set of equilibrium strategies of the disadvantaged candidate remains invariant. It is actually the move of the advantaged candidate towards the centre that eliminates incentives of the disadvantaged one to politicize the elections: the closer the advantaged candidate is to the centre the farther away from the centre the disadvantaged candidate would have to locate to politicize the elections.
At some point though, when the expected share of voters who value the non-policy characteristics of the …rst candidate becomes much larger than the expected share of voters who think that the second candidate is better, the disadvantaged candidate is better o¤ by politicizing the elections independently of where the advantaged candidate locates. From that point on the equilibrium is such that the advantaged candidate locates precisely at the centre and the disadvantaged one drifts slowly away as the share of voters who …nd his non-policy characteristics better decreases. In the limit, that is when ! 1, we converge to the equilibrium of the complete information model (see, for example, Aragonès and Xefteris, 2012). These asynchronous e¤ects of an increase in 2 [ ; 1] on equilibrium strategies -…rst only the advantaged candidate moves towards the centre and then only the disadvantaged one drifts away -are responsible for a non-monotonic relationship between the extent of heterogeneity of voters' preferences in the issue of candidates'non-policy characteristics and the maximum degree of equilibrium platform di¤erentiation.
An increasing asymmetry in how non-policy characteristics of candidates are viewed by the voters …rst decreases di¤erentiation between candidates'platforms but after a critical point it pushes these platforms farther and farther away.
Since we have introduced two novelties (heterogeneous and private valuation of candidates non-policy characteristics) in this paper a natural question is the following: to which of these two novelties one should mostly attribute existence of pure strategy equilibria? Are both of them equally necessary for pure strategy equilibria to exist or, maybe, one of them could be enough? To provide an answer, one should notice …rst that when voters have heterogeneous valuations of candidates'non-policy characteristics which are common knowledge (that is, candidates know which one is a majority's favored candidate), it is impossible to have pure strategy equilibria: the majority's favored candidate can win with certainty if he o¤ers the same policy as the other candidate and hence the other candidate has to mix in order to di¤erentiate from the favored candidate and to maintain some positive probability of election. Then one should study the case in which valuations are homogeneous but private information (that is, all voters like the same candidate but the candidates do not know who this candidate is). Existence or inexistence of pure strategy equilibria in this case is not obvious. For this reason we formally investigate this variation of the model and we …nd that indeed pure strategy equilibria exist even in this case. This shows that it is the assumption of private information, rather than heterogeneity of voters'preferences on the issue of candidates'non-policy characteristics, which allows for stable outcomes in electoral competition (pure strategy equilibria).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the model, in section 3 we analyze the model and provide equilibrium characterization results, in section 4 we analyze the variation of the model in which voters' valuations of candidates' non-policy characteristics are homogeneous and private information and in section 5 we conclude with some …nal discussion and remarks.
The model
The policy space is the [0; 1] interval. There are two candidates, A and B, and each candidate's objective is to maximize his probability of winning the election. There are n voters, an odd and …nite number. highest utility. In case of indi¤erence, a voter is assumed to vote for each candidate with probability equal to 1 2 . Since the behavior of the voters is unambiguous in this model, we de…ne an equilibrium of the game only in terms of the location strategies of the two candidates in the …rst stage of the game. A pure strategy equilibrium is a pair of candidate locations (x; y) such that both candidates are maximizing the probability of winning given the choices of the other candidate. A mixed strategy equilibrium is a pair of probability distributions ( A ; B ) over [0; 1] such that there is no mixed strategy for A that guarantees higher probability of winning than A , given B ; and there is no mixed strategy for B that guarantees higher probability of winning than B , given A .
Notice that in this setup all voters with d i (x i x) 2 > (x i y) 2 prefer to vote for candidate A.
Therefore, if x < y , we have that all voters with an ideal point x i < Similarly if x > y we have that the probability that a voter votes for candidate A is given by p(x; y; ) =
(1 max f0; _ x(x; y; d)g) + (1 )(1 min f _ x(x; y; d); 1g and the probability that a voter votes for candidate B is given by q(x; y; ) = 1 p(x; y; ). Obviously, when x = y, we have that p(x; y; ) = and q(x; y; ) = 1 because only the value of the image component will determine each voter's behavior.
Since voters'ideal points and candidates'images are independent random draws, the probability with which a candidate wins the election is given by the probability that he obtains the votes of at least a majority of the voters. Because each voter will vote for candidate A with probability p(x; y; ) the probability with which candidate A is elected may be computed by the sum of the Bernoulli distributions corresponding to at least a majority of successes over n trials, that is,
Similarly we could also show that the probability with which B wins the election is given by
Observe that p(x; y; ) and q(x; y; ) are continuous functions of x 2 [0; 1], y 2 [0; 1] and therefore P n (x; y; ) and Q n (x; y; ) are continuous functions of
. This guarantees that our game admits at least one Nash equilibrium (possibly in mixed strategies) for any parameter values (see Glicksberg, 1952) . Finally, notice that P n (x; y; ) is a strictly increasing function of p(x; y; ) and similarly that Q n (x; y; ) is a strictly increasing function of q(x; y; ).
Results
First we analyze the model for small values of 2 [
In this case we …nd that, when is small enough relative to d, there exist equilibria in pure strategies and in all of them candidates choose moderate strategies.
Proposition 1 For all d > 0 and all n 1:
2 is a Nash equilibrium of the game.
is a Nash equilibrium of the game.
In all these equilibria P n (x; y; ) =
There are no other pure strategy equilibria.
The multiple pure strategy equilibria obtained are all concentrated in a neighborhood of The size of the neighborhood that contains the equilibrium strategies depends on the di¤erence between candidates' qualities (d) and on the probability with which candidate A enjoys the advantage ( ) (see …gures 1 to 4). On the one hand, the larger the di¤erence between the candidates'qualities (d), the larger the set of policies that can be chosen in these equilibria. On the other hand, the larger the probability with which candidate A enjoys the advantage ( ), the smaller the set of policies that can be chosen in these equilibria. This set becomes smaller because when increases, candidate B becomes less likely to enjoy the advantage and therefore has more incentives to deviate to more extreme policies in order to di¤erentiate from candidate A. This is avoided when candidate A becomes more moderate as it induces candidate B to keep choosing moderate policies. As the probability with which candidate A enjoys the advantage ( ) increases, the set of pure strategies that candidate A chooses in equilibrium converges to a singleton equal to 1 2 . As increases further the equilibrium can only exist in mixed strategies, because the expected share of voters who prefer the non-policy characteristics of candidate B decreases very much and thus it becomes more pro…table for candidate B to politicize the elections; to di¤erentiate from candidate A to a signi…cant extent.
[Insert …gures 1, 2, 3 and 4 about here]
Notice that in all the pure strategy equilibria the vote is completely depoliticized -the equilibrium payo¤s of both candidates are independent of the policy platforms they propose and depend only on . This indicates that when no candidate is expected to enjoy a large enough advantage, the elections' outcome will be determined by the preferences of the voters only on one dimension -on how the evaluate the non-policy characteristics of candidates. The distribution of ideal policies will play absolutely no role on the determination of the political outcome which is, to the authors' eyes at least, the strongest implication of the above result.
As far as mixed equilibria of this case are concerned we observe the following. Given multiplicity of pure equilibria and the zero-sum nature of the game it is straightforward that a pair of probability distributions on the set of equilibrium strategies characterized by the above proposition forms a mixed strategy equilibrium. Therefore, we also have a multiplicity of mixed strategy equilibria but all equilibria, pure and mixed, yield the same moderate policy outcomes.
In order to complete the analysis we should analyze the equilibrium outcome for larger values of -for cases in which candidate A is expected to be the favored candidate of the vast majority of voters.
Observe that in the above case as the value of approaches 1 2 + 2d the equilibrium strategies of candidate A converge to 1 2 , thus in the limit candidate A is left with a unique equilibrium strategy equal to (2 1) ).
From the combination of the two previous lemmata we essentially obtain that for large values of , the mixed strategy pro…le e A = with probability 50%) is a Nash equilibrium of the game if n is large enough (n 1 4d (2 1) ). Since the threshold of n that determines the existence of the describes mixed strategy equilibrium, 1 4d(2 1) , is decreasing in and this equilibrium only exists for 2 [ 1 2 + 2d; 1] it trivially follows that a su¢ cient condition for this equilibrium to exist for any 2 [
) 2 which coincides with the square of the threshold for the population size that we had for the complete information model 3 (that is, of the case in which = 1). As the value of tends to one, the strategies of candidate B approach [Insert …gures 6 and 7 about here]
In these mixed strategy equilibria we have that the candidate A's payo¤s increase with d, ; and n. That is, increases in any parameter value that represents the advantage bene…ts candidate A and increasing the number of voters also increases candidate A's equilibrium payo¤s. What is more important is that these equilibria lead to politicized elections -both dimensions are relevant for a voter's choice. This is because in these equilibria the disadvantaged candidate will locate quite far from the advantaged candidate and hence even if a voter prefers the non-policy characteristics of the advantaged candidate it may still be the case that he will vote for the disadvantaged one because he might think that the policy platform the disadvantaged candidate proposes is so much better than the one proposed by the advantaged one. This implies that when elections have a clear favorite, voting will not be only about non-policy characteristics but about policies as well.
Homogeneous and private valuations
In this part of the paper we investigate a variation of the model in which all voters favor the same candidate but candidates do not know who is the favored one. Apart from a robustness check to the model presented above, this variation of the model is of independent interest because it captures the e¤ect of potential candidate endorsement by well thought o¤ institutions or individuals on electoral competition dynamics.
Consider the example in which the main policy issue is redistribution policy (determination of a ‡at tax rate for example) and that voters care not only about redistribution but about the moral values of the candidates as well. In this framework when an individual or organization, which is well thought o¤ by the voters (for example a local religious leader or a church), announces which one of the two candidates he believes to be more moral than the other, then this candidate naturally gains a non-policy advantage.
If it is the case that candidates, at the time in which they select platforms, are uncertain about which one of them will be endorsed by the well-thought-o¤ third party, then their problem is well described ; 1]: Notice that in this case voters'ideal points are generated by independent random draws but candidates'images are generated by a common draw.
The game takes place in two stages. In the …rst stage, candidates simultaneously choose policy positions in [0; 1]. In the second stage, voters vote for the candidate whose election would give them the highest utility. In case of indi¤erence, a voter is assumed to vote for each candidate with probability equal to 1=2.
Since the behavior of the voters is unambiguous in this model too, we de…ne an equilibrium of the game again only in terms of the location strategies of the two candidates in the …rst stage of the game. A pure strategy equilibrium is a pair of candidate locations (x;ŷ) such that both candidates are maximizing the probability of winning given the choices of the other candidate. A mixed strategy equilibrium is a pair of probability distributions (^ A ;^ B ) over [0; 1] such that there is no mixed strategy for A that guarantees higher probability of winning than^ A , given^ B ; and there is no mixed strategy for B that guarantees higher probability of winning than^ B , given^ A .
In this set up all voters withd (x i x) 2 > (x i ŷ) 2 prefer to vote for candidate A. Therefore, ifx <ŷ all voters with an ideal pointx i <x The probability with which a candidate wins the election is given by the probability that he obtains the votes of at least a majority of the voters. Because each voter will vote for candidate A with probabilitŷ p(x;ŷ; d) ifd = d and with probabilityp(x;ŷ; d) ifd = d; the probability with which candidate A is elected may be computed by the sum of the Bernoulli distributions corresponding to at least a majority of successes over n trials in each one of the possible states of the world de…ned according to the sign of the advantage, that is,
Similarly we also have that the probability with which candidate B wins the election is given bŷ Since n is assumed to be odd there exists a unique median voter. Because candidates are assumed to maximize their probability of winning and because all voters value equally candidates' non-policy characteristics, candidates are in fact maximizing the probability that the median voter votes for them. 4 In our case the distribution of the median for a …xed value of b d corresponds to the distribution of a sample of size n drawn from a uniform distribution, and in turn it coincides with the distribution of the n+1 2 th order statistic of such a sample which is distributed according to a Beta distribution with parameters
The density function of such a Beta distribution is unimodal and symmetric around decreases with n; that is, with a larger number of voters, the variance becomes smaller, and the probability that the ideal point of the median voter is close to 1 2 increases. This implies that the probability that the median votes for candidate A is given byP n (x;ŷ;^ ) = n (x;ŷ; d) + (1 ^ ) n (x;ŷ; d), that is a convex combination of two Beta distributions, and this is exactly the payo¤ function that we consider for candidate A.
Observe that, as it happens in the model with a complete information advantage, when the di¤erence between the candidates' quality is very large (d This proposition shows that moderate convergence to the expected median's ideal point in pure strategies by both parties is an equilibrium of this variation of the model for all values of^ as long as n is large enough. Notice that here again we obtain a multiplicity of equilibria in pure strategies that leads to the same candidates'payo¤s. This implies that any combination of the candidates'strategies characterized by this proposition forms a mixed strategy equilibrium, therefore, we also have a multiplicity of mixed strategy equilibria.
The variance of the distribution of the ideal point of the median voter, which in this model is parametrized by n seems to be an important parameter here. Since large n implies large probability that the median voter's ideal point is close to 1 2 , then, it should be expected that as n increases both parties tend to prefer policies that are close to 1 2 and subsequently that these equilibria lead to a depoliticized vote (a candidate is elected if and only if he is his non-policy characteristics are considered to be better than those of the other candidate). Observe that this large enough n which guarantees existence of pure strategy equilibria can be as small as one. To see this notice that this variation of our model is identical to the original game for the case in which there exists a unique voter. Hence, when n = 1, all equilibria of the original game characterized by Proposition 1 are equilibria of the present variation of the game too. In this case though, when pure equilibria do not exist a full characterization of mixed equilibria is intractable. This is so because the best response of B to a A playing a …xed pure strategy depends on n too -in the original model the best response of B to a A playing a …xed pure strategy depends only on d and on -and this complicates formal analysis to several degrees of magnitude. Despite this one can still describe qualitative features of such mixed equilibria: when only mixed equilibria exist a) A behaves, in expected terms, more moderately than B and b) A is elected with larger probability than B.
Concluding remarks
Our analysis shows that when we combine an advantage for one of the candidates with incomplete information of the candidates about the voters preferences over the non-policy candidates'characteristics, we obtain existence of pure strategy equilibria for a large range of parameter values and the possibility of diverging pure strategies in equilibrium. These features are driven by the incomplete information of candidates with respect to the advantage, because they do not appear at all in the models with complete information advantage. Indeed, when the private information of voters with respect to their valuation of the candidates'quality disappears, then the equilibrium in both models coincides with the equilibrium of the original model with a deterministic advantage.
The reason is that when we introduce incomplete information the advantage acquires a new role.
In fact, in our model the advantage is described with two di¤erent parameters. One that refers to the di¤erence between the candidates'qualities, that is already present in the models of complete information.
And a di¤erent parameter that refers to the probability with which each candidate is expected to enjoy the advantage, which is speci…c of our incomplete information advantage model.
We have that these two parameters play di¤erent roles: for larger values of the di¤erence between the candidates' qualities existence of pure strategy equilibrium is more likely, however for larger values of the probability that candidate A enjoys the advantage existence of only mixed strategy equilibria is more likely. In addition, our equilibrium outcomes show that the degree of policy divergence increases in all cases with the size of the di¤erence between the candidates' quality, following the intuition that was already known from the existing models of complete information about the advantage. However this is not the case when the other advantage parameter increases. When it becomes more and more likely that candidate A is the advantaged one, we can obtain more or less divergence in equilibrium depending on whether the size of this probability is large or small. Thus we obtain that the equilibrium policy divergence is not monotonic with respect to the size of the advantage.
The introduction of private information for the voters regarding their perception of the non-policy characteristics of the candidates has some general implications such as: (i) Pure strategy equilibria are only ruled out when voters are su¢ ciently homogeneous as far as how they value the non-policy characteristics of a candidate.
(ii) Pure strategy equilibria may be diverging.
(iii) Increasing the asymmetry of the model ( ) makes mixed strategy equilibria more likely, while increasing the di¤erence between the candidate's quality (d) makes pure strategy equilibria more likely.
(iv) When voters are su¢ ciently heterogeneous as far as how they value the non-policy characteristics of a candidate then the vote is depoliticized and when they are su¢ ciently homogeneous in that respect then the vote is politicized.
Finally, since we have modeled preferences on non-policy components as an additive constant our analysis …ts in the class of di¤erentiated candidates models analyzed by Dziubinski and Roy (2011) and Krasa and Polborn (2012) , among others. Our paper contributes to this literature by providing a characterization of global Nash equilibria in a family of setups where most results are based on computations of local Nash equilibria and su¢ cient conditions for existence of Nash equilibria.
Appendix

Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
We assume that n = 1. First we will argue that (x; y) = ( . The zero-sum nature of the game dictates that if other equilibria exist for these parameter values then the payo¤s of the candidates in these equilibria will be the same with the one we have identi…ed here.
Having in mind that our game is zero-sum we characterize the set of pure equilibria (or the sets of minimaximizer strategies for both players) in two steps: …rst we identify the set of pure strategy minimaximizers of player B and then we do the same for player A.
Step 1.
We know that the equilibrium payo¤ of A is . So if y is a minimaximizer strategy of B then it should be the case that for any x 2 [0; 1] we have that P 1 (x; y; ) .
Assume that B is playing some y 1 2 and let us check whether it is a minimaximizer strategy or not. First we note that for any x = y we have that P 1 (x; y; ) = .
We de…ne o A (y) = 1 p 1 + d 2y + y 2 that represents the most leftist policy that candidate A can choose with x y that allows him to win with probability 1 when he is the most preferred candidate, that is, even a voter with ideal point x i = 1 would prefer to vote for candidate A.
Similarly we de…ne o B (y) = p d + y 2 that represents the most leftist policy that candidate A can choose with x y that makes him lose with probability 1 when he is the least preferred candidate, that is, even a voter with ideal point x i = 0 would prefer to vote for candidate B. Finally, we simply observe that for every Step 2.
We have shown in proposition 1 that the equilibrium payo¤ of B is 1
. So if x is a minimaximizer strategy of A then it should be the case that for any y 2 [0; 1] we have that Q 1 (x; y; ) 1 .
Assume that A is playing some x 1 2 and let us check whether it is a minimaximizer strategy. First we note that for any x = y we have that Q 1 (x; y; ) = 1 .
We de…ne e B (x) = 1 p 1 + d 2x + x 2 that represents the most leftist policy that candidate B can choose with y x that allows him to win with probability 1 when he is the most preferred candidate, that is, even a voter with ideal point x i = 1 would prefer to vote for candidate B.
Similarly we de…ne e A (x) = p d + x 2 that represents the most leftist policy that candidate B can choose with y x that makes him lose with probability 1 when he is the least preferred candidate, that is, even a voter with ideal point x i = 0 would prefer to vote for candidate A.
Using the argument from the previous step, we can show that e A (x) e B (x) if and only if 1+d 2 > x: Notice that here we have that @Q 1 (x;y; ) @y > 0 for every y 2 (0; e A (x)) only when
Otherwise, when 1 2 + 2d): Now if n > 1 we notice that it is true that P n (x; y; ) = G(P 1 (x; y; )) where
n k which is strictly increasing x 2 (0; 1); P n (x; y; ) is a monotone transformation of P 1 (x; y; ).
Therefore, if for some y 2 [0; 1] we have that x maximizes P 1 (x; y; ) it must also be the case that it maximizes P n (x; y; ). In other words this model is such that if it has a pure strategy equilibrium for n = 1 then this equilibrium exists for any n.
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider that A locates at x = 1 2 . Then since Q n (x; y; ) is strictly increasing in q(x; y; ) it follows that Q n ( Moreover it is easy to check that: a) 1). This completes the proof of this lemma.
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider that B is using the strategy e B =(y = 1) with probability 50%). Then we need to show that P n (x; e B ; ) admits a with a straightforward Condorcet jury theorem like argument we obtain that lim n!+1Qn ( 1 2 ;ŷ;^ ) < 1 ^ . 5 That is, there must existñ such that whenever n >ñ deviations tô y < q 1 4 d are unpro…table for candidate B.
(ii) Ifq( What we need to show is thatQ n ( 1 2 ;ŷ;^ ) converges to 1 ^ from below because in that case there should existñ such that whenever n >ñ deviations toŷ < q 1 4 d would be unpro…table for candidate
B.
To prove thatQ n ( 1 2 ;ŷ;^ ) converges to 1 ^ from below one needs to show that for n large enough we always haveQ n ( We moreover notice that both 
